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Introduction 
This Article has two parts: Part I presents my views on Moving 
Toward Integration,1 and Part II examines one of the book’s policy 
recommendations for furthering residential integration—exclusionary-
zoning litigation—along with some of the roadblocks to this and other 
pro-integration efforts erected by the Trump Administration. 
I. Reflections on Moving Toward Integration 
Moving Toward Integration is an impressive and challenging book 
about America’s most important problem: the enduring racial divisions 
 
†  Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky 
College of Law. I thank Tim Moran and Alex Polikoff for their helpful 
insights and Sarah Welling for her editorial suggestions and constant 
support. 
1. Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: The 
Past and Future of Fair Housing (2018). 
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generated by over a century of segregated housing. There is much to 
praise about the book and also some questions to raise. 
First, the praise. The book provides a great deal of sophisticated 
analysis about difficult legal and social science concepts, presented in 
clear prose and with helpful graphics. The authors have done a 
herculean job in gathering and presenting the relevant data, cases, and 
studies. Their greatest achievement, however, is in offering new ways 
of understanding this material through original research and fresh 
analytic methods. Virtually every one of the book’s 500-plus pages 
contains a novel idea or insight, making it the most thought-provoking 
work in this field since the classic Massey & Denton study of 1993.2 
The book recognizes some fundamental problems about race-based 
housing segregation.3 These include that, despite the passage of the 1968 
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),4 such segregation remains severe in many 
parts of the country5 and that blacks who live in racially segregated 
neighborhoods suffer a variety of life-limiting, even life-threatening, 
conditions likely to harm them far into the future.6 The book also shows 
 
2. Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, American Apartheid (1993). 
3. The book’s focus is racial segregation, although it does occasionally 
comment on national-origin segregation. See, e.g., Sander et al., supra 
note 1, at 279 (noting that Hispanic and Asian segregation levels “are 
almost everywhere dramatically lower than they were in 1970, and . . . in 
2010 [were] a full tier below that of African-Americans”); id. at 354 
(addressing the question of “how the rising racial multi-polarity of 
metropolitan America affects black segregation”). 
4. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–
89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)). 
5. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 43, 174, 414 (showing various 
metropolitan areas’ segregation levels from 1880–1930, 1970–1980, and 
1990–2010); id. at 10 (showing the average segregation levels for the sixty 
largest metropolitan areas in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010). 
 The book generally relies of the “index of dissimilarity” method for 
measuring segregation. This index uses a scale of 0.0–1.0 that is based on 
the percentage of blacks who would have to move to make their 
neighborhood exactly reflect the racial make-up of the overall metropolitan 
area. See id. at 37–38. Using this index, the authors define “very high” 
levels of segregation as communities with dissimilarity scores of above .75, 
“high” as .65–.74, “moderate” as .50–.64, and “low” or “integrated” as 
below 0.50. See id. at 2–4, 39. 
6. See id. at 2 (noting that “high metropolitan levels of segregation [have] a 
powerful depressing effect on black outcomes” and describing some of 
these outcomes); id. at 335–52 (describing recent research showing that 
segregation causes a variety of bad outcomes for blacks including worse 
health, stress levels, death rates, employment opportunities, earnings, and 
poorer access to healthy food and good public services); id. at 350, 
(concluding that lower segregation rates have “very large benefits for 
[blacks] while having a neutral effect upon [whites]”); id. at 394–97 (noting 
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that the generally slow national trend of de-segregation over the FHA’s 
lifetime masks varying progress at different times (e.g., rapid progress 
in the 1970s; much less since 1980) and in different parts of the country 
(e.g., substantial progress in the West and Southwest; much less in the 
North and Midwest).7 The authors also make the point that, once a 
metropolitan area does move from heavily segregated to less so, it never 
reverts back.8 
The book’s main conclusions are that housing discrimination is no 
longer a major impediment to integration9 and that, despite a slow and 
 
that the higher rate of black versus white unemployment is much worse 
in highly segregated than moderately segregated areas); id. at 403–08 
(describing the higher levels of public spending and school integration that 
occur in less segregated areas and concluding that “[o]n nearly every 
measurable dimension, relative black outcomes are impressively 
different—and better—in metropolitan areas on the lower end of the 
segregation spectrum” and that far better outcomes for blacks flow from 
even a “small change in segregation”). 
7. See id. at 175–98 (contrasting San Diego’s sharp reduction in segregation 
with Chicago’s continuing high segregation levels in the post-FHA era and 
suggesting reasons for these differences); id. at 188 (noting generally that 
“housing segregation declined significantly more in the South during the 
1970s than in the North”); id. at 301 (noting that, after much progress in 
the 1970s, “[b]eginning in the 1980s, the [racial transition dynamic] began 
to slow . . . and by the 2000s it had, for all intents and purposes, ground 
to a halt”); id. at 394 (noting that “metro areas with very high segregation 
. . . are evolving at a snail’s pace [and that] the rate at which African-
Americans in these metro areas move to outlying areas . . . seems stuck 
at levels that are not likely to produce much desegregation on their own”); 
id. at 414 (providing a table showing three sets of five metropolitan areas 
whose segregation declines are characterized, respectively, as large (e.g., 
San Diego and Seattle), moderate (e.g., Atlanta and Dallas), and small 
(e.g., New York and Chicago)). 
8. See id. at 413 (noting that no urban area whose black–white segregation 
index has dropped below .70 or .65 “then experienced an increase in 
segregation”). 
9. See id. at 164–65 (arguing that, due to some excellent FHA enforcement 
in the early 1970s, discrimination levels had fallen “dramatically by 1977,” 
with blacks by then “more likely to encounter a good deal of fair [rather 
than discriminatory] treatment”); id. at 295–99 (concluding, based on 
HUD’s four national tester-based studies from 1977 through 2012, that 
“discrimination rates continued to fall more or less steadily . . . , in some 
cases to levels . . . practically equivalent to zero,” showing “in our view, 
a spectacular change in behavior over a relatively short period of time” 
and that “the anti-discrimination effort has been a remarkable – and 
largely unheralded – success”); id. at 409 (arguing that fair housing 
litigation “over the past fifty years has . . . succeeded in dramatically 
reducing many forms of discrimination”); id. at 411 (concluding that 
vigorous enforcement of the FHA in the 1970s “largely ended collective 
practices of discrimination by brokers and other real estate institutions”). 
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erratic record, the U.S. is winning the battle against housing 
segregation.10 The book’s positive message and optimistic tone contrast 
with the pessimism that, as the authors note, pervades much of the 
other work in this field.11 
The book takes a chronological approach, with four parts covering, 
respectively, the post-Civil War period through the FHA’s passage in 
1968; the first decade of the FHA’s enforcement; the remainder of the 
twentieth century; and the current century. A final part, “Solutions,” 
identifies twelve policy prescriptions to further reduce residential 
segregation,12 which, all being financially and politically realistic,13 
reinforce the authors’ sense that the progress that has been made in 
achieving integration can be substantially enhanced in the coming 
years. One of these proposals, banning source-of-income discrimination, 
I address at length elsewhere in this volume.14 The last one, FHA-based 
challenges to exclusionary zoning, I discuss in Part II of this Article. 
The book’s weakest points are in some of its interpretations of the 
history of fair-housing litigation. For example, the gushing treatment 
of the Justice Department’s early FHA enforcement efforts is 
unfathomable and inconsistent with my experience during that time.15 
 
10. See id. at 421 (referring to “several propitious demographic trends that 
should facilitate and sustain higher rates of desegregation” in high-
segregation areas); id. at 423 (asserting that there are “remarkably 
favorable conditions” in most high-segregation metro areas today that 
“tend to insure that increased integration will be stable and self-
reinforcing”). 
11. See id. at 7 (noting that “[f]rom the 1970s until recent years, both 
scholarship and politics on housing segregation have tended toward 
pessimism”); id. at 458 (describing the book’s “story [as] a cautiously 
optimistic one”); id. at 11 (noting that, while the authors “think the fair 
housing glass is half-full,” they see a number of reasons for being “very 
optimistic about the potential for new, carefully designed policies to have 
powerful and beneficial effects upon black segregation levels”). 
12. See id. at 423–44. 
13. See id. at 409 (describing these suggested policies as “eminently 
achievable” and “consistent with the social and political temper of the 
times”); see also id. at 449–54 (providing a modestly priced blueprint for 
a particular metropolitan area’s pursuit of these policies). 
14. See Robert G. Schwemm, Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair 
Housing Act, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 573 (2020). 
15. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 145, 158 (arguing that “the most 
important (and most overlooked) enforcement component [in the FHA’s 
early years was] the Department of Justice” and concluding that the 
“remarkable efforts of DOJ” led to “a dynamic fair housing enforcement 
effort” “[d]espite HUD’s poor performance and a mixed record among 
private groups”); see also id. at 173, 285, 411, 463 (describing the Justice 
Department’s early enforcement efforts as “aggressive,” “highly effective,” 
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I also find unpersuasive the book’s effort to elevate the importance of 
Shelley v. Kraemer,16 the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision outlawing 
court-enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.17 
 
“vigorous,” and “creative”). This view is based almost entirely on an 
interview with the then-leader of DOJ’s civil rights housing section, Frank 
Schwelb (see id. at 516 n.4, 517 nn.8–9), whose insights the authors 
consider “invaluable.” Id. at 561. 
 Mr. Schwelb’s DOJ team did bring a number of successful FHA cases, but 
these tended to be sure winners that reflected a timid, rather than a 
“dynamic” or “remarkable” approach. Id. at 158. Schwelb himself once 
remarked to me that his Justice group had never lost a case, a comment 
made with pride, but one I saw as damning of any vigorous prosecutorial 
effort. 
 The real enforcement story of the early FHA belongs to private individuals 
and groups, who were responsible for most of the early FHA cases, 
including many that established key precedents and all that reached the 
Supreme Court. Indeed, in the Court’s first FHA decision in 1972—a case 
brought by private plaintiffs represented by private lawyers—the Justice 
Department as amicus conceded that “complaints by private persons are 
the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.” See 
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Other 
important early examples included Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 367 (1982); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976) 
(constitutional claim); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977) (same), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285–
86 (7th Cir. 1977) (FHA claim). This early trend has held throughout the 
FHA’s history, with the major cases continuing to be brought almost 
exclusively by private groups. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 38, 42, 54, 
60, 75, 110, and 120. 
 Disclosure: In the 1970s, I was a staff attorney for Chicago’s Leadership 
Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, an organization mentioned 
in the book. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 156–57. My years at 
the Leadership Council led to participation in a number of important fair 
housing cases, including Arlington Heights and Gladstone Realtors. 
16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
17. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 76 (concluding, based on Shelley, 
that “[t]he landscape of urban segregation almost everywhere in America 
changed dramatically after 1948 [Shelley]”). The Court had essentially 
upheld racial covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331–32 
(1926); by the time Shelley reversed this position, the damage was done, 
and real estate agents and others could easily maintain segregation by 
racial steering, blockbusting, and other discriminatory practices. Indeed, 
the authors acknowledge that segregation levels remained high from 1950 
through 1970 (i.e., in the two decades after Shelley). See Sander et al., 
supra note 1, at 76, 174, 470. For a more detailed critique of the book’s 
treatment of Shelley, see Stephen Menendian & Richard Rothstein, 
Putting Integration on the Agenda, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 147, 165–69 (2019). 
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These bumps in the book’s historical story, however, are not central 
to its main themes. As to these themes, the points I would raise, which 
challenge somewhat the authors’ optimism, include: 
• Given the book’s recognition that most of the nation’s black 
population still lives in “very-high-segregation areas”18 and that it will 
“take generations for segregation levels in these urban areas to fall to 
[moderate levels],”19 I am skeptical about the authors’ conclusion that 
these high-segregation areas are assured of “increased [and self-
reinforcing] integration” based on “propitious demographic trends” and 
other “remarkably favorable conditions.”20 
• Given the authors’ view that much of today’s segregation is 
attributable to a concept they call “market failure,”21 I would have 
 
18. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 421; see also id. at 412 (noting that most 
of the metropolitan areas with the largest black populations (e.g., New 
York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit) have seen only small declines 
in segregation since 1970). 
19. Id. at 421; see also id. (noting that segregation levels are likely to decline 
only “incrementally” in very-high-segregation urban areas). 
20. See supra note 10. The book could have provided clearer descriptions of 
what these “propitious demographic trends” are and of how they are likely 
to ensure future integration. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 421. For 
more on demographic trends that may bode well for future integration, 
see John R. Logan & Wenquan Zhang, Global Neighborhoods’ 
Contribution to Declining Residential Segregation, 70 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev 675 (2020). 
 A countervailing trend, not accounted for in the book, is that, because 
integration requires households to move, see supra note 5, para. 2, it may 
take longer than the authors envision now that Americans are moving at 
a much slower pace than in the past. See Sabrina Tavernise, Moving Vans 
Idle as Migration Stalls in a Reshaped Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2019, at A1 (reporting Census Bureau data showing that Americans move 
far less frequently than in the past: 9.8% of Americans moved in 2019 (the 
lowest rate since the Bureau started tracking this figure in 1947) compared 
to roughly 20% each year in the 1950s). 
21. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 301 (noting the authors’ “theme that 
much black/white housing segregation comes about because of market 
failure”); id. at 174, 414, 421 (arguing that, in urban areas like Chicago 
where segregation declines have been small, the “essential problem [is] 
market failure” and concluding that, based on this problem, it will “take 
generations for segregation levels in these urban areas to fall to [moderate 
levels]”); id. at 421 (referring to “very slow desegregation rates [in certain 
metro areas that are] linked to market failure”); id. at 464 (asserting that 
“modern housing segregation is primarily a dead end of market failure”); 
see also id. at 13 (arguing that in those metropolitan areas with few 
integrated neighborhoods, this “is not a function of choices and 
preferences, but of market failure in the areas that remain highly 
segregated”). 
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welcomed a stronger explanation of this concept and of why they 
conclude it deserves such causal significance.22 
• Given that the book was mostly written during the heady days 
of the Obama Administration, is a re-evaluation now required after 
three years of Trump’s presidency? 
As to the last point, a key theme of the rest of this Article is how 
reactionary the Trump Administration has been toward fair-housing 
and de-segregation efforts. Its Departments of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) and Justice—the agencies primarily responsible 
for enforcing the FHA23—have actively worked to turn back many of 
the Obama years’ most progressive housing efforts;24 Trump has 
appointed many federal judges hostile to civil rights;25 and he has 
encouraged racial divisions that have coincided with an increase in race-
based hate crimes.26 
The book discounts these negative developments, arguing that “the 
2016 election . . . has left long-term [pro-integration] trends 
 
22. The book describes an “inverted dual housing market” in which “the 
relative housing surplus in black areas deters blacks from pioneering into 
expensive, outlying white areas [while] the high levels of segregation deter 
non-blacks from moving into black areas,” resulting in the “market 
fail[ing] to produce the wide range of stably integrated areas that a vast 
number of blacks and whites would like to live in.” Id. at 309; see also id. 
at 421 (describing the problem of “market failure” as “the inverted dual 
housing market”). A related question is why, given that “market failure” 
means that black neighborhoods tend to be poor, see id. at 4, 394–97, the 
authors are so optimistic that this—and the resulting segregation—will 
change. 
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(a), 3610–12, 3614a, 3616 (2012) (HUD); id. 
§§ 3612(o), 3614 (Justice); see also infra note 39 (describing HUD’s 
authority to issue FHA regulations). 
24. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Trump and Senate Republicans Celebrate Making 
the Courts More Conservative, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www 
 .nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/trump-senate-republicans-courts.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/E9LK-44XU] (reporting that, in its first three years, the Trump 
Administration placed forty-five conservative judges on the U.S. courts of 
appeals, amounting to one-quarter of all such appellate judges, and that 
the “the effect of [these] appointments in making decisions is already being 
felt”). For a recent FHA example, see Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. 
v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019) (Trump-appointee 
Kurt D. Engelhardt wrote the majority opinion), petition for reh’g en 
banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. __ 
(2020). 
26. See, e.g., Adeel Hassan, Hate-Crime Violence Hits 16-Year High, F.B.I. 
Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
 11/12/us/hate-crimes-fbi-report.html [https://perma.cc/CX4V-6QMA]. 
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undisturbed.”27 The authors reason that enforcement of the FHA and 
other anti-discrimination laws is no longer the key to progress in this 
field,28 which instead they view as virtually guaranteed by positive 
demographic forces and an ever-growing acceptance of integration by 
the American people.29 We shall see. 
II. Reflections on Modern Exclusionary-Zoning Cases 
A. Background: The Book’s Strategy #12 and an Overview of Relevant 
FHA Law 
The book’s last of twelve proposed integration strategies deals with 
“[d]isparate impact litigation on zoning.”30 Here, the authors identify 
the basic Supreme Court and appellate precedents that have addressed 
zoning and other local land-use practices used to limit affordable 
housing projects in white areas;31 describe in detail a 2000 Texas district 
court case;32 suggest that the Justice Department “could become more 
involved in bringing [such] suits,” at least if “political conditions 
change” (i.e., after the Trump Administration);33 and conclude that, 
although such litigation is often contentious and protracted and its 
potential efficacy should not be over-estimated, “the stick of disparate 
impact litigation” can be helpful in challenging particular “exclusionary 
barriers within a metropolitan area.”34 
The book is correct that exclusionary-zoning cases have been an 
important part of FHA litigation ever since the statute’s earliest years. 
Three theories of liability ultimately emerged in FHA-based cases 
accusing municipalities of racial discrimination in blocking affordable 
 
27. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 458. 
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
29. See supra note 10; Sander et al., supra note 1, at 307–08 (describing 
the “[r]ising white tolerance for integration” as a “recurring theme of this 
book” and as growing significantly stronger since the FHA’s enactment in 
1968); see also id. at 398–402 (describing the steady increase in interracial 
marriage since the 1960s and the growth in the number of Americans that 
self-identified as multiracial in the recent decennial censuses). 
30. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442. Much of an early chapter on 
“Exclusionary Zoning and Structural Segregation” is devoted to state “fair 
share” programs, see id. at 238–43, and the book’s eleventh suggested 
policy strategy deals with this topic. See id. at 440–41. 
31. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442, 554 n.34. 
32. Id. at 442–43. 
33. Id. at 444. 
34. Id. 
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housing projects.35 Obviously, a FHA claim could be based on 
intentional discrimination, with the required proof of the defendant’s 
illicit motivation being essentially the same as would violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under the Supreme 
Court’s 1977 decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation.36 In addition, two separate types of 
discriminatory-effect claims—disparate-impact and segregative effect—
soon came to be recognized, primarily as a result of decisions by the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits in the 1970s37 and the Second Circuit's 
1988 decision in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.38 
Neither of these discriminatory-effect claims requires a showing of 
illegal intent, and both were endorsed in a 2013 regulation promulgated 
by HUD (“Current Rule”).39 Under the Current Rule, which was 
 
35. The three theories of liability described in the rest of this paragraph are 
available in all FHA cases, not just those involving exclusionary-zoning 
claims. There is, however, a distinction between these land-use cases and 
all others under the FHA, at least insofar as HUD’s authority is 
concerned. This is because Congress’s 1988 amendments to the FHA, 
while mandating that the agency issue general FHA regulations, see 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 3,231, 3,234 (Jan. 23, 1989), also required HUD to defer to the 
Justice Department in handling exclusionary-zoning complaints. See 42 
U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C) (2012) (barring HUD from issuing a charge in any 
FHA administrative complaint that “involves the legality of any State or 
local zoning or other land use law or ordinance” and requiring that HUD 
“immediately refer [such] matter to the Attorney General for appropriate 
action under [§ 3614(b)(1)]”); see also 24 C.F.R. § 103.400(a)(3) (2019) 
(setting forth HUD’s procedures for complying with this provision). As a 
result, HUD’s FHA regulations have generally shied away from making 
substantive pronouncements about this type of FHA case. 
36. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
264–71 (1977). 
37. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1288–94 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 
1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974). 
38. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–
38 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). 
39. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (promulgating 24 
C.F.R. § 100.500). As the agency primarily responsible for administering 
the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2012), HUD’s regulations interpreting 
the FHA are entitled to substantial deference. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 
U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003). HUD’s commentary on its 2013 discriminatory-
effect regulation noted that the agency had long recognized both types of 
discriminatory-effect claims under the FHA. See Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,461–62. 
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designed in part to provide national uniformity in evaluating FHA-
effect claims,40 both theories are subject to the same three-step burden-
shifting proof scheme, with the plaintiff having the initial burden of 
proving that the defendant’s challenged practice causes a 
discriminatory effect.41 
In 2015, the Supreme Court endorsed FHA disparate-impact claims 
in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.,42 concluding that the disparate-impact 
theory is a way of bolstering the FHA’s “continuing role in moving the 
Nation toward a more integrated society.”43 Although Inclusive 
Communities was not a traditional exclusionary-zoning case,44 the 
Court recognized that FHA-outlawed practices “include zoning laws 
and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude 
minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient 
justification.”45 According to Inclusive Communities, “[s]uits targeting 
such practices reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability,” a 
proposition for which the Court cited Huntington and two other cases.46 
Again citing Huntington, the Court noted that the disparate-impact 
 
 HUD is currently considering amendments to its discriminatory-effect 
regulation. See infra Part II.C.2. 
40. See infra note 93. 
41. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c). For a description of this three-step process, 
see Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462. 
42. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
43. Id. at 2526. This conclusion was made in Inclusive Communities’ 
penultimate paragraph, which also recognized the FHA’s role “in our 
Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation [and in] striving to 
achieve our ‘historic commitment to creating an integrated society’” and 
stated: “The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner 
Commission’s grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur Nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.’” Id. at 2525 
(citations omitted). 
44. See id. at 2522–25 (expressing skepticism about the plaintiff’s “novel” 
claim in this case, which alleged that a state agency approved housing 
proposals under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program in a way 
that resulted in most Dallas-area projects being located in poor, 
predominantly black inner-city neighborhoods as opposed to white 
suburban communities and which the Court characterized as challenging 
new developments “in one location rather than another”). 
45. Id. at 2521–22. 
46. Id. at 2522; see also id. at 2519–20 (citing Huntington, Black Jack, and 
the Seventh Circuit’s remand decision in Arlington Heights among the 
appellate decisions that Congress in the FHA’s 1988 amendments 
“accepted and ratified”). 
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theory has allowed plaintiffs to vindicate the FHA’s objectives “by 
stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in practice, 
discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types of 
housing units.”47 
The Court in Inclusive Communities did not base its ruling on 
HUD’s 2013 regulation, but the opinion did cite that regulation and 
HUD’s commentary on it with apparent approval on three occasions.48 
Inclusive Communities also set forth certain “cautionary standards” to 
guard against improper FHA impact claims,49 which were similar to the 
standards established in HUD’s regulation.50 
B. Post-Inclusive Communities Commentary and Cases 
After the Court decided Inclusive Communities, I wrote articles on 
both the disparate-impact and segregative-effect theories of FHA 
liability in light of that decision.51 Both articles included sections on 
how the respective theories would apply to future exclusionary-zoning 
cases,52 and indeed the segregative-effect article made the point that 
this theory has been used almost exclusively in such cases.53 
Within a year after Inclusive Communities, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits produced major decisions involving FHA exclusionary-zoning 
claims. The first was Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau,54 
where the Second Circuit affirmed much of the plaintiffs’ victory in 
challenging a white city’s opposition to a proposed 300-unit, mixed-
income development whose likely tenants would include a substantial 
 
47. Id. at 2522. 
48. See id. at 2514–15, 2522–23. 
49. Id. at 2522–24. 
50. Both the Inclusive Communities opinion and the HUD regulation suggest 
that FHA disparate-impact claims should be judged according to a three-
step, burden-shifting analysis similar to the process for evaluating Title 
VII employment-discrimination claims. See id. at 2522–24; 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500(c). For more on whether the standards set forth in Inclusive 
Communities differ from those in HUD’s 2013 regulation, see infra note 
84 and accompanying text. 
51. See Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair 
Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709 (2017); Robert G. 
Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing 
Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
685 (2016). 
52. See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 749–51; Schwemm & Bradford, supra 
note 51, at 751–60. 
53. See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 715, 735. 
54. 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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number of minorities.55 The trial court in Mhany had ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs’ discriminatory intent claim and also found that the 
defendant-city’s action had both a disparate impact on minorities and 
a segregative effect.56 The Second Circuit upheld liability on the intent 
claim,57 affirmed the findings below on the first two steps of the 
discriminatory-effect analysis,58 and remanded for further proceedings 
on the effect claim’s third element (i.e., whether the city’s legitimate 
interests could be achieved by a “less discriminatory alternative”).59 
Two days after Mhany, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in 
Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma,60 which upheld the 
plaintiffs’ intent-based claim challenging the defendant’s refusal to 
rezone land for a moderately priced, predominantly Hispanic 
development and also ruled that summary judgment should not have 
been entered against their disparate-impact claim.61 With respect to the 
former, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on allegations that the city 
was influenced by neighbors’ race-based statements of opposition,62 a 
 
55. Id. at 590, 608–09, 624–25. Mhany was decided a few months after another 
post-Inclusive Communities Second Circuit exclusionary-zoning decision, 
Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 
2015). In Anderson Group, the Second Circuit reinstated a jury verdict in 
favor of an affordable housing developer that accused the defendant of 
impact-based discrimination in blocking the plaintiff’s proposed project. 
Id. at 38, 56. According to Anderson Group, the governing FHA legal 
framework was based on the Second Circuit’s 1988 decision in Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), 
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). See Anderson Group, 805 F.3d at 
49. 
56. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 599, 617. 
57. Id. at 605-16. 
58. Id. at 616–20. 
59. Id. at 617-19. On remand, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs on this 
point, see Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, No. 05-CV-
2301, 2017 WL 4174787, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), after which the 
case ended with a multi-million-dollar settlement. See Settlement 
Agreement at 3, Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, No. 05-
CV-2301 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019), ECF 626-1; Recent Settlements, Fair 
Housing-Fair Lending Rep., at ¶4.7 (Apr. 2019) (reporting settlement 
agreement that included $5,400,000 for the plaintiff-developer, $450,000 
for other developers, $120,000 for a fair housing organization, and 
attorney’s fees). 
60. 818 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016). 
61. Id. at 496–97. The Ninth Circuit did, however, affirm the district court’s 
granting of the defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs’ 
segregative-effect claim. Id. at 513. 
62. Id. at 504–07. 
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factor that had also been persuasive in the Mhany case.63 As for the 
impact claim, the appellate court held that the court below should not 
have rejected this claim based on the availability of other modestly 
priced housing in the area.64 
These post-Inclusive Communities decisions provide further 
support for using the FHA’s disparate-impact theory—and, to a lesser 
extent, its segregative-effect theory—to challenge exclusionary-zoning 
practices. Neither appellate court saw any significant difference between 
how such a claim is evaluated under Inclusive Communities and the 
HUD regulation,65 and indeed Mhany held that the HUD regulation 
should supplant prior Second Circuit precedent governing the burden 
of proof in an effect claim’s third step.66 Also, both decisions served as 
reminders that intent-based claims can also succeed in this type of 
case,67 in part because evidence of impact discrimination is relevant in 
proving illicit intent68 and also because both the Second and Ninth 
Circuits were willing to interpret hostile comments by neighbors about 
the proposed development as code phrases for anti-minority 
sentiments.69 Many of these same themes were also reinforced by district 
court decisions in post-Inclusive Communities exclusionary-zoning 
cases.70 
 
63. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606–10. 
64. See Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 509-13. On remand, the trial court found 
sufficient evidence to deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
as to the plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim, see Ave. 6E Investments, LLC 
v. City of Yuma, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2017), after which 
the case was settled. See Conditional Settlement and Release Agreement 
at 2, 4, Ave. 6E Investments v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-CV-00297-JJT 
(D. Ariz. June 11, 2019), ECF 343-1 (providing for settlement that 
included $2,850,000 for the plaintiff-developer and rezoning of specified 
parcels for future development of affordable housing). 
65. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 618; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 512–13. The Ninth 
Circuit did not discuss this issue in its analysis of the plaintiff’s disparate-
impact claim, but the district court on remand regularly relied on the 
HUD regulation in upholding this claim. See Ave 6E, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 
1047 n.28, 1048 nn.34–35, 1050 n.50, 1051 n.55. 
66. Mhany, 819 F.3d at 617–19. 
67. See also 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 
F.3d 673, 678–85 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding, in a pre-Inclusive 
Communities decision, that plaintiffs’ intent-based claim could proceed 
while their impact-based claim failed); Mhany, 819 F.3d at 624. 
68. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 507–08. 
69. See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606–11; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 503–07. 
70. See, e.g., Gilead Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Cromwell, No. 3:17-cv-627 
(VAB), 2019 WL 7037795, at *21–25 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2019); Ave. 6E, 
217 F. Supp. 3d at 1047–48. 
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C. The Trump Administration’s Attack on Fair Housing and 
Exclusionary-Zoning Cases 
1. Overview 
As noted in Part I, Moving Toward Integration’s optimistic 
conclusions take little account of the steps taken by the Trump 
Administration to undercut fair-housing enforcement generally and to 
limit race-based integration efforts and exclusionary-zoning suits in 
particular.71 Along with the appointment of many federal judges hostile 
to civil rights,72 these steps include: 
• the Justice Department’s virtual refusal to file any race-based 
or exclusionary-zoning cases under the FHA,73 and its general hostility 
to the disparate-impact theory of liability under all civil-rights 
statutes;74 
• HUD’s attempt to delay its 2016 rule adjusting fair-market-rent 
standards for the Housing Choice Voucher program, which was enjoined 
 
71. Critiques of the Trump Administration’s civil-rights record abound. For 
an example focused on fair housing, see Stephen M. Dane, Fair Housing 
Policy Under the Trump Administration, Hum. Rts., May 2019, at 18. 
72. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
73. In the Trump Administration’s first three years, the Justice Department 
filed about forty FHA cases, only three of which alleged anti-black 
discrimination (two involving mortgage redlining by Midwest banks and 
one (based on a HUD investigation and charge) challenging a California 
town’s biased enforcement of its rental ordinance). See Civil Rights 
Division Press Releases, Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
 civil-rights-division-press-releases-speeches [https://perma.cc/A2Y2-NYWF] 
(last visited May 27, 2020) (providing press releases for all filed cases). As 
for race-based exclusionary-zoning cases, the Justice Department’s only 
reported activity during this three-year period was to settle a case against 
a Chicago suburb that had been filed during the Obama Administration. 
See Justice Department Obtains $410,000 Settlement of Housing 
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Tinley Park, Illinois, for Refusing to 
Approve Low-Income Housing Development, Dep’t of Just. (Aug. 24, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-obtains-410000-
settlement-housing-discrimination-lawsuit-against-tinley [https://perma.cc/ 
 P5GV-6B5A]. 
74. See Laura Meckler & Devlin Barrett, Trump Administration Considers 
Rollback of Anti-Discrimination Rules, WASH. POST  (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-
considers-rollback-of-anti-discrimination-rules/2019/01/02/f96347ea-046d-
11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6WR-UM57] 
(reporting on a Justice Department memo that directed senior civil rights 
officials to examine how decades-old disparate-impact regulations might 
be changed or removed in their areas of expertise and noting that similar 
action was being considered at HUD and other agencies). 
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for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as a result of 
privately initiated litigation;75 
• HUD’s reversal of its 2015 regulations governing local 
jurisdictions’ responsibilities to foster housing integration by 
affirmatively furthering fair housing (“AFFH”), an effort that was 
unsuccessfully challenged in court;76 
• HUD’s proposed—and currently pending—changes to its FHA 
discriminatory-effect regulation, which would substantially restrict 
effect-based claims, as described below.77 
The only potentially positive action taken by the Administration in 
this field is a mostly rhetorical effort to reduce local-government 
restrictions on affordable housing that, as of early 2020, had only 
produced HUD’s announcement of a proposed regulation.78 
 
75. See Open Cmtys. All. v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 156–61, 179 (D.D.C. 
2017). For a detailed description of the Housing Choice Voucher program 
(also known as “Section 8”), see Schwemm, supra note 14, at 10–16. 
76. See Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 36, 66 (D.D.C. 
2018) (ruling against APA-based challenge to HUD’s delay in implementing 
its 2015 AFFH regulations). In early 2018, HUD suspended until 2025 the 
obligation of most jurisdictions to submit the fair-housing assessments 
mandated by the 2015 AFFH regulations. 
 In mid-2019, HUD announced its intent to “streamline” the AFFH 
regulations, see Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and 
Enhancements, 84 Fed. Reg. 40,713, 40,715 (Aug. 16, 2019), and in early 
2020, HUD published proposed new regulations. See Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,041, 2,041 (Jan. 14, 2020) (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903, 905). Among other 
things, this proposed rule would effectively eliminate consideration of race 
and residential segregation from HUD’s assessment of whether its grantees 
are fulfilling their FHA-affirmative obligations, see id. at 2,042, 2,044, and 
local jurisdictions, though free to “undertake changes to zoning or land-
use policies as one method of complying with the AFFH obligation,” 
would not “have their certification questioned because they do not choose 
to undertake zoning changes.” Id. at 2046. 
77. See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
78. See White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to 
Affordable Housing; Request for Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,549, 64,549–
50 (Nov. 22, 2019) (requesting, pursuant to a mid-2019 Executive Order, 
public comment by early 2020, “on Federal, State, local, and Tribal laws, 
regulations, land use requirements, and administrative practices that 
artificially raise the costs of affordable housing development and contribute 
to shortages in housing supply”). For a critique of this effort by two senior 
officials of the National Fair Housing Alliance, see Debby Goldberg & 
Morgan Williams, Zoning Is Not the Answer to All Our Housing Problems, 
THE HILL (Nov. 7, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-
rights [https://perma.cc/C28L-GPFU]. 
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2. HUD’s Proposed Changes to its Discriminatory-Effect Regulation 
On August 19, 2019, HUD proposed major amendments to its 
discriminatory-effect regulation (“Proposed Rule”).79 The proposed 
amendments would eliminate any reference to the segregative-effect 
theory of liability80 and, with respect to disparate-impact claims, would 
require plaintiffs to allege five new elements in their complaint81 while 
providing additional protections for defendants, including a series of 
“safe harbors”82 and more favorable burdens of proof.83 HUD’s principal 
rationale for these amendments was “to bring HUD’s disparate impact 
rule into closer alignment with the analysis and guidance provided in 
Inclusive Communities as understood by HUD.”84 
 
79. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,857 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 
24 C.F.R. pt. 100). The Proposed Rule also included changes to certain 
other HUD-FHA regulations. See id. at 42,857 (noting that this rule also 
proposes to “incorporate minor amendments to [24 C.F.R.] §§ 100.5, 
100.7, 100.70, and 100.120”). 
80. See infra notes 103–110 and accompanying text. 
81. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858. The five elements are: 
(1) That the challenged policy or practice is arbitrary, artificial, 
and unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective; 
(2) That there is a robust causal link between the challenged 
policy or practice and a disparate impact on members of a 
protected class; 
(3) That the challenged policy or practice has an adverse effect 
on members of a protected class; 
(4) That the alleged disparity caused by the policy or practice is 
significant; and 
(5) That there is a direct link between the disparate impact and 
the complaining party’s alleged injury. 
 Id. at 42,858–59. 
82. See id. at 42,859 (to be codified under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)) (proposing 
three new methods of defense). 
83. See id. at 42,860 (to be codified under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)) (proposing 
higher burden of proof for plaintiffs while giving defendants easier burden 
to rebut plaintiff’s case). 
84. Id. at 42,857; see also id. at 42,854 (noting that the proposed amendments 
are designed to “better reflect the Supreme Court’s 2015 rule in [Inclusive 
Communities]”); id. at 42,861 (opining that the Current Rule needs 
extensive changes because courts and the public are “forced to reconcile 
how to implement HUD’s regulations consistent with Inclusive Communities” 
and a new rule would provide clarity and allow entities to avoid “the need 
to research and compile case law since Inclusive Communities”). 
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The Proposed Rule provided for a two-month comment period,85 
during which HUD received over 45,000 comments, many critical.86 
HUD is obligated under the Administrative Procedure Act to consider 
these comments,87 which means that the agency will be hard pressed to 
issue a final rule for many months.88 Still, a Trump Administration 
priority has been to narrow the FHA’s effect theory,89 and HUD seems 
likely to adopt a final rule by the end of 2020.90 To the extent that the 
final rule is similar to the Proposed Rule, it will likely face an APA-
based court challenge91 and, depending on the results of the 2020 
 
 HUD’s view that the Current Rule is substantially inconsistent with 
Inclusive Communities is at odds with most post-Inclusive Communities 
cases. See National Fair Housing Alliance, Comment Letter on HUD’s 
Proposed Rule 49–56 (Oct. 18, 2019), available at https://www.regulations 
 .gov/document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3079 (gathering cases); see, e.g., 
Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(stating that “[t]he Supreme Court implicitly adopted HUD’s [Current 
Rule]” in Inclusive Communities); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank of 
America, N.A., 401 F. Supp. 3d 619, 631 (D. Md. 2019) (describing 
Inclusive Communities as “[h]ewing closely” to the Current Rule); Prop. 
Cas. Insurers Assoc. of Am. v. Carson, No. 12-cv-10456, 2017 WL 
2653069, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2017) (noting that “the Supreme Court 
in Inclusive Communities . . . did not identify any aspect of HUD’s 
[Current Rule] that required correction”).  
85. See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,854. 
86. See Businesses, Policymakers, Advocates, Experts Submit Thousands of 
Comments Opposing HUD’s Attack on Core Civil Rights Tool, Nat’l 
Fair Housing Alliance (Oct. 23, 2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/ 
 2019/10/23/businesses-policymakers-advocates-experts-submit-thousands-of-
comments-opposing-huds-attack-on-core-civil-rights-tool/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 4WTH-AAJJ]. 
87. See, e.g., Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1018, 1048–51 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing, inter alia, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
88. By way of comparison, it took HUD about fifteen months to finalize its 
discriminatory-effect rule after it proposed the rule, a process that 
included having to consider less than 100 public comments. See 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463–64 (Feb. 15, 2013). 
89. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
90. HUD’s latest regulatory plan called for final action on the Proposed Rule 
in April 2020. Dept. Hous. & Urban Dev., RIN No. 2529-AA98, 
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate 
Impact Standard, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain 
[https://perma.cc/PJA4-JMEZ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
91. Cf. Open Cmty. All. v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148 (D.D.C. 2017) (ruling 
on APA-based challenge to new HUD rule dealing with housing program); 
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presidential election, may be revoked or substantially changed by HUD 
in a new administration. 
3. The Proposed Rule’s Potential Effect on Exclusionary-Zoning 
Litigation 
If something like the Proposed Rule does become final, what effect 
will it have on future FHA exclusionary land-use litigation? As noted 
above, HUD has generally avoided any attempt to regulate such 
litigation on the ground that the statute gives enforcement authority in 
these cases to the Justice Department,92 but both the Proposed Rule 
and its predecessor purport to govern all types of FHA claims93 and 
thus apply to FHA claims in court as well as in administrative actions 
before HUD.94 
Clearly, the Proposed Rule would make exclusionary-zoning cases 
much more difficult for plaintiffs to win. As commentators on this rule 
have noted, its new disparate-impact pleading requirements might have 
 
Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). 
For more on these cases, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.  
92. See supra note 35. 
93. For examples of exclusionary-zoning cases that have relied on the Current 
Rule, see Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618–619 
(2d Cir. 2016); Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 217 F. Supp. 3d 
1040, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2017). See also Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,472 (noting 
that one of the purposes of the Current Rule was to establish “uniform 
standards” for FHA discriminatory-effect cases in order to “simplify this 
type of litigation”). 
94. Both rules explicitly purport to apply to the parties in a court case 
(“plaintiff” and “defendant”) as well as those in an administrative 
proceeding (“charging party” and “respondent”). See Implementation of 
the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,855, 
42,862–63 (Aug. 19, 2019) (proposing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)–(d)); id. at 
42,859 (commenting that the defenses proposed in amended 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500(c) may be raised “through a variety of procedural motions,” 
such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment under, 
respectively, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56)); Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,482 (“The charging party, with respect to a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
3612, or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 
3613 or 3614, has the burden of [proving Step One]”); id. at 11,474 
(commenting on the ability of “plaintiffs or complainants” to demonstrate 
Step Three through Rule 26(b)(1) discovery); see also supra notes 65, 70 
(giving examples of court cases that have applied the Current Rule). 
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derailed even some of the classic “heartland” exclusionary-zoning cases 
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities.95 
The Proposed Rule would also negatively affect these cases in other 
ways, two of which are particularly noteworthy.96 First, in limiting 
disparate-impact claims to those that challenge “policies or practices” 
as opposed to “single events,” HUD explicitly identifies “a local 
government’s zoning decision” as being in the latter, inappropriate 
category.97 The basic “policy” requirement is derived from dicta in 
 
95. See Justin Steil et al., M.I.T. Dep’t of Urban Studies and Planning, 
Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard 7 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
 document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3331 [https://perma.cc/6D75-Q28C]; see 
also 154 Law Professors, Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of 
the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard 2 (Oct. 18, 2019) 
(concluding that, with respect to “exclusionary land use rules and other 
policies that perpetuate segregation, . . . [HUD’s Proposed Rule] strips 
plaintiffs of this necessary, congressionally-intended tool by making 
disparate impact claims nearly impossible to bring”); Calvin Bradford, 
Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard 35 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.regulations 
 .gov/document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3437 [https://perma.cc-9DZZ-HJX5] 
(concluding, in comments by an experienced expert witness in disparate-
impact cases, that the Proposed Rule’s imposition of “new and unjustified 
burdens of proof on the plaintiffs” and “safe harbors” for defendants 
amounts to “an attack on the very theory [of disparate-impact liability 
as] supported in the case law and in the [Inclusive Communities] 
decision”). 
96. In addition to the two examples described in the text, the Proposed Rule 
would limit disparate-impact claims to challenging practices that 
“actually” (as opposed to “actually or predictably”) result in a 
discriminatory effect, by deleting the portion of the Current Rule stating 
that a practice has a discriminatory effect “where it actually or 
predictably results” in a disparate impact. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) 
(2017); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory 
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,468 (finding that actions that 
“predictably” result in discriminatory effects should be covered). The 
Current Rule’s position is supported by many exclusionary-zoning 
decisions, including one then cited by HUD to support this point that was 
later described by the Supreme Court as a “heartland” disparate-impact 
case. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (citing United States v. City 
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)). 
97. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 
84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858 (stating that the plaintiff’s burden of identifying a 
“particular policy or practice that causes the disparate impact” will 
generally not be met by “alleging that a single event—such as a local 
government’s zoning decision or a developer’s decision to construct a new 
building in one location instead of another—is the cause of a disparate 
impact, unless the plaintiff can show that the single decision is the 
equivalent of a policy or practice”) (emphasis added). 
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Inclusive Communities,98 but HUD’s gratuitous extension of it to 
immunize most zoning decisions99 is actually inconsistent with Inclusive 
Communities’ endorsement of key exclusionary-zoning precedents,100 
with post-Inclusive Communities cases,101 and with modern land-use 
practices.102 
 
98. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (noting that “a plaintiff 
challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new building 
in one location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is 
a policy causing a disparate impact because such a one-time decision may 
not be a policy at all”). 
99. The only example given in Inclusive Communities of a plaintiff 
inappropriately challenging a “single decision” as opposed to a “policy” 
was “the decision of a private developer to construct a new building in 
one location rather than another.” See id. at 2523. 
100. See id. at 2519 (citing with approval exclusionary-zoning decisions that 
involved FHA challenges to municipalities’ refusal to rezone a specific 
parcel for a particular project). 
101. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (holding that the complaint here “about a [rezoning] decision 
affecting one piece of property . . . falls well within a classification of a 
‘general policy’” susceptible to a disparate-impact challenge); Ave. 6E 
Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-CV-00297 JWS, 2018 WL 582314, 
at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting, in upholding disparate-impact 
challenge to a one-time zoning decision, that “not all one-time decisions 
are equal” and that “[i]t is the type and effect of the decision that dictates 
whether it can be subject to a disparate impact claim”). 
 HUD’s commentary on this point does not acknowledge Mhany or Ave. 
6E, but instead relies on a single non-zoning trial-court decision. See 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 
Fed. Reg. at 42,858 n.37 (citing Barrow v. Barrow, No. 16-11493-FDS, 
2017 WL 2872820, at *2–3 (D. Mass. July 5, 2017) (dismissing pro se 
plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim in dispute among siblings over the terms 
of a will and the devise of their mother’s property)). 
102. For a detailed exposition of this point, see N.Y.U. Furman Center, Comment 
Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate 
Impact Standard at 17–23 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.furmancenter.org/ 
 files/2019-10-17_Disparate_Impact_Comments_FINAL.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc-894D-P8MK] (describing contemporary land-use regulation as 
“a highly discretionary process characterized by individualized decisions,” 
noting that the federal government has regularly recognized that most 
land-use decisions “now include a discretionary component involving 
individual decisions,” and concluding that the Proposed Rule’s exclusion 
of single-zoning decisions from the FHA’s disparate-impact coverage 
“would foreclose review of many, and perhaps most, land use decisions—
no matter how arbitrary or unjustified”). 
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Second, the Proposed Rule deletes any reference to the FHA’s 
“segregative-effect” theory of liability,103 whose primary value has been 
in challenging exclusionary-zoning practices.104 Although HUD provides 
no justification for this change, it is presumably intended to align the 
discrimination-effect regulation with Inclusive Communities,105 which 
only dealt with and endorsed the disparate-impact theory.106 Whatever 
HUD’s motivation here, its abandonment of the segregative-effect 
theory reverses the agency’s long-held position.107 Moreover, it ignores 
decades of cases recognizing this theory,108 not to mention Inclusive 
 
103. Compare Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,855 (Aug. 19, 2019) (providing, at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500, that FHA liability may be established “based on a specific 
policy’s or practice’s discriminatory effect on members of a protected 
class”), with Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory 
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (providing, at 24 
C.F.R. § 100.500(a), that FHA liability may exist where a practice results 
in “a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, 
reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race [or 
other prohibited factor]”) (emphasis added). 
104. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Among the advantages of the 
segregative-effect theory in exclusionary-zoning cases is that it, unlike the 
disparate-impact theory, may challenge a particular action or one-time 
decision as well as a “policy.” See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 736–38; 
supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. According to HUD’s 
commentary on this aspect of the Proposed Rule, the key part of the 
regulation “would be slightly amended to reflect the removal of a 
definition for discriminatory effect.” Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858. 
106. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–25 (2015) (dealing only with the 
question of whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA). 
107. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469. When an agency makes such a change, the APA 
requires that it “display awareness that it is changing position” and 
provide a “detailed justification” for the change. See FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); accord Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016). 
108. See, e.g., United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(recognizing that practices leading to the “perpetuation of segregation” 
violate the FHA); Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 
488 U.S. 15, 17 (1988) (affirming that the Second Circuit properly found 
disparate impact when a town’s practices “significantly perpetuated 
segregation in the Town”); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469 & n.102 
(noting FHA cases endorsing this theory spanning nearly five decades). 
See generally Schwemm, supra note 51, at 715–36 (describing cases). 
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Communities’ endorsement of many of these cases109 and post-Inclusive 
Communities cases that have continued to rely on this theory.110 
More generally, this aspect of the Proposed Rule reflects HUD’s 
current indifference to the FHA’s role in fostering integration. In 
deleting all but one tangential reference to segregation,111 the Proposed 
Rule ignores the agency’s and the courts’ longstanding recognition of 
the FHA’s integration goals and Inclusive Communities’ powerful 
statements about the FHA’s importance as a tool for combating 
residential segregation.112 
 
109. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2519, 2522 (citing these cases 
regularly and recognizing “perpetuating segregation” as a basis for FHA 
liability). 
110. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619–20 
(2d Cir. 2016); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 401 F. Supp. 
3d 619, 640–41 (D. Md. 2019); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Travelers Indem. 
Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 20, 34 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Ave. 6E Invs. v. City 
of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that, after Inclusive 
Communities, the FHA “forbids actions by private or governmental bodies 
that create a discriminatory effect upon a protected class or perpetuate 
housing segregation without any concomitant legitimate reason”). 
111. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standards, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42857 (Aug. 19, 2019) (proposing to 
amend an example of unlawful behavior in the FHA steering-and-services 
regulation adopted by HUD in 1989 [24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a)]). The 
Proposed Rule would add to this regulation’s final example “procedures, 
building codes, [and] permitting rules,” so that the new version outlaws 
“[e]nacting or implementing land-use rules, ordinances, procedures, 
building codes, permitting rules, policies or requirements” that restrict 
housing opportunities on a prohibited basis. See id. at 42,862 (proposing 
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(5)) (emphasis added). It thus would extend the 
current regulation’s prohibitions to include the italicized techniques to the 
land-use rules, ordinances, and other elements that are already included 
in § 100.700(d)(5). According to HUD, this proposed addition is simply 
“for clarity in connection with the changes HUD is making” in its 
discriminatory-effect regulation. Id. at 42,857. 
112. See Stacy Seicshnaydre, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for HUD’s 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standards 2 
(Oct. 18, 2019). According to Professor Seicshnaydre's analysis, HUD’s 
2013 commentary on the Current Rule made thirty-eight references to 
segregation and ten references to integration and the Inclusive 
Communities opinion made six references to segregation, three references 
to integration, and additional references to racial isolation. See id.; see 
also Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2522 (noting that the FHA’s 
disparate-impact theory curbs practices that “arbitrarily creat[e] 
discriminatory effects or perpetuat[e] segregation”); id. at 2550–51 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (noting, in the principal dissent, that the “the ‘purpose’ 
driving the Court’s analysis” is “[t]he desire to eliminate the ‘vestiges’ of 
‘residential segregation by race’”); supra note 43 and accompanying text 
(providing additional examples of the Inclusive Communities opinion’s 
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Given the strong judicial support for the segregative-effect theory, 
HUD’s abandonment of it in the Proposed Rule may simply be ignored 
by the courts. There is also reason to suppose that courts will not follow 
HUD’s proposed restrictions on pleading disparate-impact claims, 
because federal agencies do not have the authority to set such 
standards.113 
For example, the Proposed Rule purports to establish a heightened 
pleading standard for FHA disparate-impact claims by setting forth five 
new “elements” of a prima facie case that a plaintiff must plead,114 but 
HUD lacks the power to do this. Federal-court pleading standards are 
set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require only “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”115 Courts do not have authority to impose more exacting 
 
recognition of the FHA’s integration goal). By contrast, the Proposed 
Rule makes only one reference to segregation and no references to 
integration. See Seicshnaydre, supra. 
113. See generally Olatunde Johnson et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule 
for HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standards 1 (Oct. 18, 2019) (opining that the Proposed Rule may violate 
the APA by, inter alia, addressing “matters beyond the FHA; specifically, 
to evidentiary and procedural issues as they may arise in cases brought 
under the FHA in federal or state courts”). The judiciary need not defer 
to HUD’s position on such matters, because they involve areas of law 
(e.g., court procedural rules) for which the agency has no authority to 
administer. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984) (limiting judicial deference to an “agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers”). 
114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (setting forth these elements); 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standards, 
84 Fed. Reg. at 42,859 (proposing that defendants may assert the absence 
of any of these elements in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 
115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Satisfying this standard requires a plaintiff to 
assert facts that make the claim “plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). This is generally not difficult in FHA cases. See, e.g., City of 
Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1271, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019), 
vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020); Reyes v. Waples Mobile 
Home Park Ltd. P’ship, 903 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 2026 (2019); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403–07 
(7th Cir. 2010); cases cited infra note 120. 
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requirements beyond this standard,116 and certainly agencies do not.117 
Nor does HUD have any power to govern pleading requirements in state 
courts, which may entertain FHA claims,118 including those involving 
effect-based challenges to exclusionary zoning.119 In addition, the 
Proposed Rule conflates prima-facie and burden-shifting standards with 
pleading standards, which courts have consistently not allowed in post-
Inclusive Communities discriminatory-effect cases.120 
The fact that much of the Proposed Rule may ultimately be ignored 
by the courts, however, does not mean that HUD’s effort here will not 
harm plaintiffs in future exclusionary-zoning cases. Litigants and courts 
in these cases will, at the least, have to struggle with a burdensome set 
of preliminary issues created by the Proposed Rule. Thus, unlike the 
Current Rule, which was designed to bring needed uniformity to FHA 
 
116. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“A 
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that 
‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not 
by judicial interpretation.’”) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). 
The federal rules may be amended only pursuant to the Rules Enabling 
Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–74 (2012). 
117. Cf. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a federal regulation requiring banks to withhold certain documents 
from discovery was “plainly inconsistent” with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing discovery and thus “cannot be enforced” in the 
absence of an enabling statute “more specific than a general grant of 
authority”). 
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
119. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 
337–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); cf. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. 
Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 406–14 (Mass. 2016) (dealing with FHA-effect 
claim in non-zoning context); Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners 
Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008) (same). 
120. See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, No. 18 CV 
839, 2019 WL 5963633, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2019); Washington 
v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 16CV3948ENVSMG, 
2019 WL 5694102, at *21–22 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019); Nat’l Fair Hous. 
All. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 401 F. Supp. 3d 619, 634–38 (D. Md. 2019); 
Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 940, 
947–48 (N.D. Cal. 2018); County of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 
314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Winfield v. City of New 
York, No. C 15-5236, 2016 WL 6208564, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016) 
(noting that “a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, . . . not a 
pleading requirement” and that Inclusive Communities “did not alter the 
plausibility standard for pleading, which requires only the plaintiff plead 
allegations that plausibly give rise to an inference that the challenged 
policy causes a disparate impact”). 
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discriminatory-effect claims,121 the Proposed Rule is likely to split courts 
and add new uncertainty in this area.122 Moving Toward Integration 
already notes that FHA exclusionary-zoning litigation has limited 
“potential efficacy . . . for practical reasons,”123 and having an 
oppositional federal government certainly does not make it any easier. 
Conclusion 
A recurring question in Moving Toward Integration is whether the 
Fair Housing Act and its enforcement through litigation have been of 
significant value in reducing housing discrimination and thereby 
increasing residential integration. This question has also animated 
much of my career. Lawyers tend to assume that law influences 
behavior. There is, however, surprising little empirical research to 
support this proposition. There is even less research on why people 
choose to obey or disobey a particular law, as I discovered some years 
ago when I examined why rental discrimination rates were continuing 
at such high levels decades after the FHA’s enactment.124 
The book’s basic answer is that early FHA enforcement was 
effective in ending institutional resistance to race-based housing 
discrimination, opening the way for substantial increases in integration; 
thus continued effective enforcement is now less important because the 
pro-integration forces unleashed in earlier decades virtually ensure 
future desegregation.125 I am skeptical about a number of these 
propositions. 
I do agree, however, that the FHA has had a profoundly positive 
impact on the Nation’s integration efforts. Without knowing exactly 
how this has happened, it is clear that the public’s acceptance of housing 
integration has greatly increased over the FHA’s fifty years and that 
 
121. See supra note 93. 
122. See Nat’l Fair Housing Alliance, supra note 84, at 56 (opposing the 
Proposed Rule in part because it “would inject inconsistencies and 
uncertainty into existing law”); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of 
Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing, in the course of 
upholding FHA discriminatory-effect challenge to town’s zoning decision, 
that “other circuits have described the distinction between a single 
isolated decision and a practice as ‘analytically unmanageable [because] 
almost any repeated course of conduct can be traced back to a single 
decision’”) (quoting Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 
AFL-CIO v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
123. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 444. 
124. See Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (and 
What Can Be Done about It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 489–90 
(2007). 
125. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
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this is now a powerful force in itself, wholly apart from legal sanctions. 
Those of us who were alive when the FHA was passed remember its 
opponents saying, “You can’t legislate morals,” and “A law can’t 
change people’s minds,” but clearly this is not true. Most Americans 
today have known only a country where fair housing is the law of the 
land, and most of these people take for granted that the FHA’s anti-
discrimination mandate is a core principle of our country. 
It is sobering to remember, however, that the history of civil rights 
in the United States is not one of inevitable steady progress. For 
example, the advances made in the aftermath of the Civil War were 
soon followed by decades of Jim Crow. Backsliding is always possible. 
And today, a good deal of race-based housing discrimination remains, 
not only in practices that negatively impact minorities but in those 
prompted by intentional bias.126 Further, as outlined in Part II above, 
the Trump Administration has actively pursued a reactionary path to 
civil rights and race relations, blatantly encouraging racial divisions and 
hostility to integration.127 
Thus, I believe—in contrast to the book—that vigorous 
enforcement of the FHA continues to be important, both to expose 
racism and deter discrimination and to encourage positive public 
attitudes toward the FHA’s integration goals. Such enforcement has 
always depended primarily on private groups and people. Whatever the 
post-Trump era brings in terms of federal FHA enforcement, the Nation 
will continue to have to rely on these private efforts to help ensure 
future residential de-segregation. 
 
 
126. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. And while some of these 
intent-based practices are hidden in code words or are otherwise covert, 
see supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text, others are explicit and 
blatant, see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Graham, HUD 
Office of Hearings and Appeals No. 19-JM-0014-FH-002 (HUD ALJ Jan. 
6, 2020), modified in part on other grounds, (HUD Secretary Feb. 5, 2020) 
(finding FHA violation based on landlord’s racist statement to black 
prospect). 
127. See supra Part II.C.1; see also supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
